We argue for a new approach to examining the relationship between tariffs and growth. We demonstrate that more can be learned from time series analyses of the experience of individual countries rather than the usual panel data approach, which imposes a causal relation and presents an average coefficient for all countries. Tentative initial results using simple two variable cointegrated VAR models suggest considerable heterogeneity in the experiences of the countries we look at. For most, however, there was a negative relationship between tariffs and levels of income for both the preand post-Second World War periods. However, in the second half of the twentieth century, the causality ran from income to tariffs: i.e. countries simply liberalized as they got richer. Policy decisions based on the usual panel approach might thus be very inappropriate for individual countries. Abstract: We argue for a new approach to examining the relationship between tariffs and growth. We demonstrate that more can be learned from time series analyses of the experience of individual countries rather than the usual panel data approach, which imposes a causal relation and presents an average coefficient for all countries. Tentative initial results using simple two variable cointegrated VAR models suggest considerable heterogeneity in the experiences of the countries we look at. For most, however, there was a negative relationship between tariffs and levels of income for both the pre-and post-Second World War periods.
Introduction
Does trade liberalization promote economic growth, and hence increase per capita incomes?
We suggest a new approach to this question which has spawned a multitude of studies with a wide range of methodologies and conclusions. This previous work rests largely on the results from panel data studies, but we argue that more can be learned with appropriate time series analyses (cointegrated VARs) for individual countries.
2 In doing so, we do not discount the importance of the panel data approach, which has some important theoretical implications.
Rather, we question the way in which these results are presented and indeed used by policymakers.
As is well known, a central plank of the 'Washington Consensus' (see Williamson 1990, chapter 2) is the claim that import liberalization is growth promoting. But if a negative relationship is identified using the panel data approach, can this really be taken as an indication that on the individual country level, tariffs must be harmful for growth? Economic theory is in any case ambivalent about this question.
A recent example from the tariff-growth literature is given by Warcziag and Welch (2008) , who find that countries that liberalize foreign trade have had 1.42 percentage point higher growth rates in comparison to before and to non-liberalizers. 3 What would they have to say about the experience of Japan after the war, where trade policy was actively used to promote growth? 4 Or should we expect to identify a tariff-growth relationship for the UK from the 1860s to at least the First World War, when tariffs were kept continuously at a very low level? Economic history presents its own challenges to the literature, with discussion of a 'tariff-growth paradox' and a positive relationship changing to negative after World War I. 5 Others, such as Nicholas
Crafts, have pointed out that the institutional environment in each country is a crucial determinant, and point to the East Asian experience as an illustration of this (Crafts 2004) .
Another limitation of panel data is that it imposes a causal relationship from tariffs to growth.
This assumption is not trivial. Most of today's rich countries embarked on modern economic growth behind protective barriers, but later liberalized. As Rodrik (2007, states: 'The only systematic relationship is that countries dismantle trade restrictions as they get richer.'
We discuss the limitations of the panel data approach, and compare it to the advantages of estimating fully-specified country-specific cointegrated VAR models, which can allow for both positive and negative relationships between tariffs and growth, and can also give some indication as to the causality of the relationship (see Johansen 1996 and Juselius 2006) .
Appropriate time series analysis can help document these individual country level experiences and can better handle questions of endogeneity and parameter stability than can panel data.
Using this approach, we point towards a true understanding of what underlies the measures of protection in each individual country, and we can demonstrate the successes and failures of individual experiences with tariff policy through history.
Since we cannot hope to demonstrate the heterogeneity we suggest with fully specified models in this paper, we make our point by estimating cointegrating relationships between average ad valorem equivalents of the tariff rates and GDP for a large number of countries. Our first task is to collect the best possible series of tariff and income measures. We then estimate simple two variable cointegrated VAR models. The cointegrating relationships can be considered a sort of robust correlation coefficient, since as is well known cointegration as a property is robust to the addition of other variables (Pashourtidou 2003) . Our models also give an indication of the (Granger) causal relation, but these must be interpreted with caution, since they are more sensitive to the addition of other variables in a more fully specified model. Some heterogeneity is found, but generally the relationship was negative before the Second World War, with the causality from tariffs to GDP. Although also negative the relationship after the war was with reversed causality: countries liberalized as they grew richer. Some examples of successful tariff policy, and thus a positive relationship, are also identified, however. 4
Literature survey, theory and problems
While there is no sensible economic theory that gives the result that autarky is preferable to an open economy, there might be cases where selective protection can lead to higher growth rates than free trade. Rodríguez and Rodrik (2000, 267-72) give an overview of the relevant theories. Even the father of the Washington Consensus, Williamson (1990) , concludes that one exception from the general rule of free trade might be the temporary protection of infant industries to widen the domestic industrial base and help the emergence of what has been called dynamic comparative advantages. These refer to economic activities in which a country does have a comparative advantage which under current circumstances cannot be made effective. If these 'dynamic' comparative advantages hold a potential for higher economic growth and domestic knowledge development with concurrent spillover effects than the apparent current ('static') comparative advantage, then temporary protection should increase incomes in the long run.
Still, the general case favors free trade. Standard neoclassical theory points to one-off income gains from reallocation after going from autarky to free trade. In the standard Solowframework, however, it is unlikely that permanently higher growth rates result from the transition to free trade, since growth rates in that framework are determined by exogenous factors like total factor productivity growth. However, 'newer' endogenous growth theory has been able to explain productivity growth, and provided an argument for free trade, as trade barriers are likely barriers to the world technology pool, and hence retard domestic productivity growth. Via this, the level of protection has a negative influence on the level of economic growth. Empirically, first-generation cross-country growth models following the formulation of endogenous theory, aimed to explain 20-to 30-year averages (c. 1960-90) Since 2000, several studies dealing with economic growth after 1945 have actually investigated the tariff-growth relationship, using fixed effects panel methods (using mostly 5-to 10-year averages) and/or instrumental variable approaches to control for the potential reverse causality from economic growth/high incomes to the level of protection. Clemens and Williamson (2004) find that the relationship was negative after 1950, but positive before, confirming Vamvakidis (2002) . Yanikkaya (2003) found that especially for developing countries the relationship was positive . This result has been put into context by DeJong and Ripoll (2006) reductions might lead to one-time gains from reallocation and thus higher short-term growth rates, which however might not necessarily lead to higher total factor productivity growth and 'steady-state' income growth rates in the long run. In other words, the effects of liberalization might be 'static' rather than 'dynamic', in which case the one-time gains should be easier to 7 trace in levels than in growth rates. There is now also a discussion in growth economics,
following Hall and Jones (1999) and Jones (2000) , about the use of levels in growth regressions.
Although we have of course made an effort to calculate them correctly, the figures in Table 1 should be taken with a grain of salt, since the authors use different methods, ways of estimating elasticities, control variables, sample sizes, etc., and the transformation of these into a common framework might involve misunderstandings as well as assumptions about their sample mean (which we reconstructed from our data if not given). We have not included the results of the recent study by Schularick and Solomou (2011) in this table, since their aim is actually to show how little robust the tariff-growth relationship is for the period of the first globalization. Their coefficients for log(1+tariff rate) on log(GDP per capita) range from -2.9 to +0.5 (but insignificant in both cases) for the main specifications reported in the body of their paper. 
1875-1914 70
Vamvakidis (2000), T. 1 -0.60% (min) -1.49% (max) yes (min) no (max) 1970-90 54
Vamvakidis (2000) for the period before World War I, the range is -1.75% to +6.67%, while for periods after 1950 results range between -2.32% and +2.89% if we only take significant results from other studies into account.
This might be a consequence of the panel data approach of growth regressions, which estimates average coefficients over individual country experiences and their processes in different periods. We argue that such 'average' coefficients, whether unconditional or conditional on time-invariant country-fixed effects, might have the right sign and even be statistically significant, but they still must not necessarily be (or are unlikely to be) true for all countries in the sample, a necessary condition for the strict prescription of 'Washington medicine'.
Other issues result from sample selection and inclusion of different control variables. Also, a lot of information is lost by averaging over 5-to 30-year periods.
11 Most seriously, perhaps, while instrumental variable approaches can 'filter out' potential one-way causality, they do not look at the growth/income-tariffs relationship, which might also exist: Economic growth could actually lead to decreasing tariff levels because tariffs become fiscally less important and are replaced by revenues from a wider tax base (Kubota 2005 Therefore, we conclude that the central criticism to AVE, that it uses import values as weights across commodities and therefore puts low weights on highly protected goods and even ignores prohibitive tariffs, while it puts high value on duties imposed to generate much revenue (Irwin 2010, p. 111) , is most problematic when there is a difference in the structure of tariffs and imports across countries. 14 However, in the same country these differences should matter much less and therefore make AVE a more homogeneous and reliable measure of trade policy restrictions.
As an empirical underpinning of this assumption we can invoke Irwin (2010) and 1961 and compares it to the US AVEs. He finds that the correlation coefficient between both is 0.92, while the levels of his TRI are 75% higher. Our data on both components of the AVE, customs revenues and import volumes, comes from a variety of national sources. By this, we considerably improve the existing best-practice dataset assembled by Clemens and Williamson (2004) , which we used as a basis for our research. 15 The main problem with that dataset, apart from data gaps in their AVE time series, lies in the large break observed for many countries between the tariff levels at the end of their pre-1950 and the beginning of their post-1950 series. We therefore revisited their pre-1950 sources and added large amounts of data from other sources, detailed in Appendix 2, to ensure that both customs revenue and import volume series were consistent over time. We draw our data from authors who are especially interested in the assessment of long-run trends in the economy of their particular country therefore ensuring that the series we use are as comparable over time as they possibly can be.
Nevertheless, for some countries, notably the United Kingdom, France and Italy, we have not been able to find coherent series over time, and were therefore obliged to chain series with different levels. 16 The results obtained with the series for Italy and the UK are not satisfactory, which might be due to the quality of the data.
To make our results comparable to those of the cross-country studies discussed above, we also estimate an illustrative model for 'the world', which is actually a weighted average of the 24 countries in our sample. 17 We also calculate an analogous weighted average of the O'Rourke 
Our econometric approach
Our approach thus focuses on time series analysis of yearly data for individual countries and a world average. We make use of the cointegrated VAR model and the methodology suggested by Juselius (2006) . 18 Due to our approach we are able to use all available data points and do not have to average over several periods to be able to identify long run relationships. Previous research using cointegration methods in this field has focused on single countries and short time periods, and normally uses the rate of trade (or just imports) to GDP as a measure of liberalization, an indicator that is clearly inadequate as a proxy for trade policy, since governments cannot control imports directly (except in a state-run economy).
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The variables used in the subsequent analysis are y, which is the natural logarithm to the level of GDP per capita, and ave which is the ad valorem equivalent. We wish to emphasize again that we are not suggesting that these are fully specified models, and that we are presenting robust estimates of the tariff-income relationship for the countries we look at. Indeed, as
Pashourtidou (2003) has demonstrated, omitted relevant variables will make it less likely to identify cointegration and will bias the adjustment coefficients (thus making it difficult for us to conclude anything about causality here). Nevertheless, any cointegrating relationships found are robust to omitted variables, which allows us to say something about the heterogeneity between our countries for those where we do find cointegration. A fully specified model would include other relevant determinants of GDP, such as factors of production, real exchange rates, terms of trade, measures of institutional quality, etc.
Thus, in order to model the long-run relationship between income and AVEs the following model is estimated: Ghatak, Milner and Utkulu (1995) for Turkey, who use proxies similar to Sachs and Warner. To our knowledge, the only study that uses tariff rates to explain income growth is a working paper by Athukorala and Chand (2007) for Australia . They use Hendry's 'general to specific' method which is different from our approach.
14 where ܺ ௧ = ሺ‫ݕ‬ ௧ , ‫݁ݒܽ‬ ௧ ሻ′ and t is the trend.
This model assumes that the ‫‬ = 2 variables in ܺ ௧ are related through r equilibrium relationships with deviation from equilibrium ‫ݑ‬ ௧ = ߚ′ܼ ௧ , and ߙ characterizes the equilibrium correction. It holds that ߙ and ߚ are ‫ݎݔ‬ matrices and the rank of Π = ߙߚ′ is ‫ݎ‬ ≤ ‫.‬ The autoregressive parameter, Γ, models the short-run dynamics, and throughout it is assumed that ߝ ௧~݅ ݅݀ܰ ሺ0, Ωሻ.
The model assumes that the residuals are iid and normally distributed (Juselius 2006). We thus report in Appendix 1 the PcGive tests for (no) autocorrelation up to second order and for normality. The most serious misspecification occurs in the case of autocorrelation which, however, is only a problem for Italy and the UK in the first period, countries where we know the data is particularly poor.
The analysis also relies on the choice of a lag-length of 2 in the model in equation (1) being correct. Using information criteria, it is found that k=2 lags are in fact sufficient to characterize the systematic variation in the model in both periods in all cases. Moreover, the model assumes constant parameters, and since there is strong evidence of the relationship changing around about the interwar period, the sample is split in two: 1865 (or later if the data was not available) to 1913 and from 1950 to 2000. We initially tried including the World War and interwar years in one of the periods, but these years proved rather difficult to model due to a very large number of outliers. 20 After each estimation we used recursive estimation (both forwards and backwards) to check the stability and robustness of the estimates.
A crucial step in the analysis is to determine the number of equilibrium relationships, r. Since we only have two variables, we expect ‫ݎ‬ = 1 if there is any causal relationship between the variables. We found early on that growth of GDP per capita appears in almost all cases to be an I(0) stationary process, while AVEs seem to be an I(1) non-stationary process. This implies that there can never be a cointegrating relationship between GDP growth and levels of AVEs. We 15 thus look for a cointegrating relationship between (log) levels of GDP per capita and levels of AVEs.
For illustrative purposes, Figure 1 gives the levels and differences of y and ave. The first differences of y (growth rates) are clearly stationary I(0), highlighting the point made above, whereas ave appears to be I(1). Also apparent from Figure 1 is the great instability of the variables during the World Wars and the interwar period, thus justifying the exclusion of these years. Since the usual trace test is biased towards stationarity with limited samples, we also make use of other methods for determining the number of cointegrating relationships. More specifically, we make use of graphs of the cointegrating relations, we look at the roots of the Companion matrix, and we plot recursive graphs of the trace test statistics (see Juselius 2006 for more on determining the cointegration rank). In most cases, an assumption of one unit root seems appropriate and is justified in as much as it allows for greater ease of interpreting the estimation results (Johansen 2006) .
Results
As mentioned before, we perform the above analysis for the 24 countries we have data for, plus an average for 'the world' and for the original O'Rourke (2000) ten-country-sample. Since we have two periods, but for three countries (Colombia, Mexico and Peru) it is impossible to analyze the first period due to lack of data, we estimate a total of 49 models. We cannot of course report all our results here, but a summary of the results illustrating the countries with each causal relation 21 is given in Tables 1 and 2 . Here we have also included those with no significant cointegrating relationship, because it is difficult to identify cointegration with few observations, so the results might give some indication of what might be identified had we more years of data. We have also highlighted those results where there is misspecification of the residuals: one star indicates that the residuals are very non-normal (i.e. a high number of outliers), and two stars indicate that there is autocorrelation. We could control for these using dummies or extra lags, but to keep the results as comparable as possible we have chosen not to do so. The full cointegrating relationships we identify are reported in Appendix 1.
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Interestingly, for both 'the world' and the O'Rourke sample, the sign is clearly negative in both periods (although this is clearer for the second). This is perhaps what we should expect: despite potential country level benefits from protecting certain industries or sectors of the economy, for the world as a whole increasing tariffs is a zero-sum game. However, the causality is not 21 Note that causality can be in both directions, even with only one cointegrating relationship. This implies that both variables adjust in order to reestablish equilibrium in the event of a change to one of them. 22 Even more detailed results, including standard errors and the results of the various specification tests described above are available on request.
17 always clear, and for the second period it seems that it points in the other direction, consistent with the statement by Rodrik and the theoretical arguments given above above.
Referring to the magnitude of the coefficients on tariffs in our results, except a few outliers commented on below, we find them in the fat part of the distribution of results obtained in the studies mentioned in the literature review above using the panel approach (assuming again that our long run estimates are comparable with their changes over 30 years). In relation to this is should be remembered that the panel estimates are in a sense averages for all countries, so some outliers are to be expected. Again, we emphasize that care must be taken in interpreting these results. Even if we were able to estimate the 'true' model, they would depend on at least two factors: what countries choose to do with their tariffs, and whether or not they succeeded in this. So for example, a country might choose infant industry protection and thus expect a positive relationship. But if they
were not successful, we will not identify this.
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Then, due to the limitations of our simple two variable model, failure to find a significant cointegrating relationship does not imply that none existed, as explained above. In particular, 19 the causal relationships are very tentative. It might be noted at this point that some countries have very poor data (particularly France, Italy and the UK), which makes it more difficult to identify a relationship. Clearly, however, we can already here observe considerable heterogeneity in the experiences of these countries. The main direction for the first period was negative, and mostly involved causality from tariffs to income (including two-way relationships). The positive relationship between tariffs and income is only identified for the US, Chile, Norway and possibly Brazil.
The result for the US is perhaps particularly worth noting, since it actually shows the tariff- The second period, despite also seeming to be mostly associated with a negative relationship, displays reverse or two-way causality for all countries in that part of Table 2 , thereby providing relatively more evidence for the income-tariff side of the relationship than for its more prominent incarnation, the tariff-income relationship. However, one might ask why not all of these countries did not experience an increase in income due to this additional move to free trade. We believe that a part of the answer lies in the generally low levels of protection in these countries, and therefore very low deadweight losses from existing tariffs (cf. Irwin 2010). 24 The most important channel for liberalization to lead to better economic performance is trade, and trade at the aggregate level might not have been seriously affected by tariffs during most of our period for the said countries. Therefore, on the one hand, we agree with a large body of recent literature (e.g., Nunn and Trefler 2010 , Estevardeordal and Taylor 2008 , Lehmann and O'Rourke 2008 , Tena 2010 ) that at any level of protection, it matters what you protect, and on the other hand, we believe that liberalization from higher levels of protection should have stronger effects on income than from already very low levels.
Some apparently problematic results also warrant attention: the results for Sweden, the Netherlands and Australia in the first period and for Germany, Italy, Spain and Switzerland in the second period show very high coefficients for the causal relationships from AVEs to tariffs.
We believe that for most of these -all except Spain and Switzerland in the second period -this is, together with the sometimes very low adjustment parameters, an indication that although we detect two-way causality the prevalent causal relationship is from income to tariffs (see also 
Conclusion
We have argued for a new approach to understanding the tariff-growth/income relationship.
We demonstrate that time series analysis can better describe the actual impact of tariffs on an individual economy, which can then be interpreted in terms of political motivations, institutional settings, and the like.
As we have repeatedly stressed, our results are tentative, but we see a number of promising avenues for future research. Most obviously, the lack of evidence for the tariff-growth paradox could be investigated further. Then, particular cases such as the United States and India before the First World War might be taken up again within more fully specified models to investigate the robustness of our findings. For the second period, it is tempting to look more closely at the prevalent finding of 'reverse causality' in the post-war years, again within more fully specified models, in an attempt to falsify the Washington Consensus. 
